Self-stabilization is a versatile approach to fault-tolerance since it permits a distributed system to recover from any transient fault that arbitrarily corrupts the contents of all memories in the system. Byzantine tolerance is an attractive feature of distributed systems that permits to cope with arbitrary malicious behaviors.
Introduction
The advent of ubiquitous large-scale distributed systems advocates that tolerance to various kinds of faults and hazards must be included from the very early design of such systems. Self-stabilization [4, 6, 19 ] is a versatile technique that permits forward recovery from any kind of transient faults, while Byzantine Fault-tolerance [14] is traditionally used to mask the effect of a limited number of malicious faults. Making distributed systems tolerant to both transient and malicious faults is appealing yet proved difficult [7, 2, 17] as impossibility results are expected in many cases.
Two main paths have been followed to study the impact of Byzantine faults in the context of self-stabilization:
• Byzantine fault masking. In completely connected synchronous systems, one of the most studied problems in the context of self-stabilization with Byzantine faults is that of clock synchronization. In [1, 7] , probabilistic self-stabilizing protocols were proposed for up to one third of Byzantine processes, while in [5, 12] deterministic solutions tolerate up to one fourth and one third of Byzantine processes, respectively.
• Byzantine containment. For local tasks (i.e. tasks whose correctness can be checked locally, such as vertex coloring, link coloring, or dining philosophers), the notion of strict stabilization was proposed [17, 18, 16] . Strict stabilization guarantees that there exists a containment radius outside which the effect of permanent faults is masked, provided that the problem specification makes it possible to break the causality chain that is caused by the faults. As many problems are not local, it turns out that it is impossible to provide strict stabilization for those.
Our Contribution. In this paper, we investigate the possibility of Byzantine containment in a self-stabilizing setting for tasks that are global (i.e. there exists a causality chain of size r, where r depends on n the size of the network), and focus on a global problem, namely breadth-first spanning tree construction. A good survey on self-stabilizing solutions to this problem can be found in [11] .
In particular, one of the simplest solution is known under the name of min + 1 protocol (see [13] ). This name is due to the construction of the protocol itself. Each process has two variables: one pointer to its parent in the tree and one level in this tree. The protocol is reduced to the following rule: each process chooses as its parent the neighbor which has the smallest level (min part) and updates its level in consequence (+1 part). [13] proves that this protocol is self-stabilizing. In this paper, we propose a complete study of Byzantine containment properties of this protocol.
In a first time, we study space Byzantine containment properties of this protocol. As strict stabilization is impossible with such global tasks (see [17] ), we use the weaker scheme of topologyaware strict stabilization (see [9] ). In this scheme, we weaken the containment constraint by relaxing the notion of containment radius to containment area, that is Byzantine processes may disturb infinitely often a set of processes which depends on the topology of the system and on the location of Byzantine processes. We show that the min + 1 protocol has optimal containment area with respect to topology-aware strict stabilization.
In a second time, we study time Byzantine containment properties of this protocol using the concept of strong stabilization (see [15, 8] ). We first show that it is impossible to find a strongly stabilizing solution to the BFS tree construction problem. It is why we weaken the concept of strong stabilization using the notion of containment area to obtain topology-aware strong stabilization. We show then that the min + 1 protocol has also optimal containment area with respect to topologyaware strong stabilization.
Distributed System
A distributed system S = (P, L) consists of a set P = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } of processes and a set L of bidirectional communication links (simply called links). A link is an unordered pair of distinct processes. A distributed system S can be regarded as a graph whose vertex set is P and whose link set is L, so we use graph terminology to describe a distributed system S. We use the following notations: n = |P | and m = |L|.
Processes u and v are called neighbors if (u, v) ∈ L. The set of neighbors of a process v is denoted by N v , and its cardinality (the degree of v) is denoted by ∆ v (= |N v |). The degree ∆ of a distributed system S = (P, L) is defined as ∆ = max{∆ v | v ∈ P }. We do not assume existence of a unique identifier for each process. Instead we assume each process can distinguish its neighbors from each other by locally arranging them in some arbitrary order: the k-th neighbor of a process v is denoted by
In this paper, we consider distributed systems of arbitrary topology. We assume that a single process is distinguished as a root, and all the other processes are identical.
We adopt the shared state model as a communication model in this paper, where each process can directly read the states of its neighbors.
The variables that are maintained by processes denote process states. A process may take actions during the execution of the system. An action is simply a function that is executed in an atomic manner by the process. The actions executed by each process is described by a finite set of guarded actions of the form guard −→ statement . Each guard of process u is a boolean expression involving the variables of u and its neighbors.
A global state of a distributed system is called a configuration and is specified by a product of states of all processes. We define C to be the set of all possible configurations of a distributed system S. For a process set R ⊆ P and two configurations ρ and ρ ′ , we denote ρ R → ρ ′ when ρ changes to ρ ′ by executing an action of each process in R simultaneously. Notice that ρ and ρ ′ can be different only in the states of processes in R. For completeness of execution semantics, we should clarify the configuration resulting from simultaneous actions of neighboring processes. The action of a process depends only on its state at ρ and the states of its neighbors at ρ, and the result of the action reflects on the state of the process at ρ ′ .
We say that a process is enabled in a configuration ρ if the guard of at least one of its actions is evaluated as true in ρ.
A schedule of a distributed system is an infinite sequence of process sets. Let Q = R 1 , R 2 , . . . be a schedule, where R i ⊆ P holds for each i (i ≥ 1). An infinite sequence of configurations e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . is called an execution from an initial configuration ρ 0 by a schedule Q, if e satisfies ρ i−1
. Process actions are executed atomically, and we also assume that a distributed daemon schedules the actions of processes, i.e. any subset of processes can simultaneously execute their actions. We say that the daemon is central if it schedules action of only one process at any step.
The set of all possible executions from ρ 0 ∈ C is denoted by E ρ 0 . The set of all possible executions is denoted by E, that is, E = ρ∈C E ρ . We consider asynchronous distributed systems where we can make no assumption on schedules except that any schedule is fair : a process which is infinitely often enabled in an execution can not be never activated in this execution.
In this paper, we consider (permanent) Byzantine faults: a Byzantine process (i.e. a Byzantinefaulty process) can make arbitrary behavior independently from its actions. If v is a Byzantine process, v can repeatedly change its variables arbitrarily.
Self-Stabilizing Protocol Resilient to Byzantine Faults
Problems considered in this paper are so-called static problems, i.e. they require the system to find static solutions. For example, the spanning-tree construction problem is a static problem, while the mutual exclusion problem is not. Some static problems can be defined by a specification predicate (shortly, specification), spec(v), for each process v: a configuration is a desired one (with a solution) if every process satisfies spec(v). A specification spec(v) is a boolean expression on variables of P v (⊆ P ) where P v is the set of processes whose variables appear in spec(v). The variables appearing in the specification are called output variables (shortly, O-variables) . In what follows, we consider a static problem defined by specification spec(v).
A self-stabilizing protocol ( [4] ) is a protocol that eventually reaches a legitimate configuration, where spec(v) holds at every process v, regardless of the initial configuration. Once it reaches a legitimate configuration, every process never changes its O-variables and always satisfies spec (v) . From this definition, a self-stabilizing protocol is expected to tolerate any number and any type of transient faults since it can eventually recover from any configuration affected by the transient faults. However, the recovery from any configuration is guaranteed only when every process correctly executes its action from the configuration, i.e., we do not consider existence of permanently faulty processes.
Strict stabilization
When (permanent) Byzantine processes exist, Byzantine processes may not satisfy spec(v). In addition, correct processes near the Byzantine processes can be influenced and may be unable to satisfy spec(v). Nesterenko and Arora [17] define a strictly stabilizing protocol as a self-stabilizing protocol resilient to unbounded number of Byzantine processes.
Given an integer c, a c-correct process is a process defined as follows.
Definition 1 (c-correct process)
A process is c-correct if it is correct ( i.e. not Byzantine) and located at distance more than c from any Byzantine process.
given at most f Byzantine processes, in any execution starting from ρ, every c-correct process v always satisfies spec(v) and never changes its O-variables.
The parameter c of Definition 2 refers to the containment radius defined in [17] . The parameter f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes, while [17] dealt with unbounded number of Byzantine faults (that is f ∈ {0 . . . n}).
Definition 3 ((c, f )-strict stabilization) A protocol is (c, f )-strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . contains a configuration ρ i that is (c, f )-contained for spec.
An important limitation of the model of [17] is the notion of r-restrictive specifications. Intuitively, a specification is r-restrictive if it prevents combinations of states that belong to two processes u and v that are at least r hops away. An important consequence related to Byzantine tolerance is that the containment radius of protocols solving those specifications is at least r. For some problems, such as the breadth-first search (BFS) spanning tree construction we consider in this paper, r can not be bounded by a constant. In consequence, we can show that there exists no (c, 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for the breadth-first search (BFS) spanning tree construction for any (finite) integer c.
Strong stabilization
To circumvent the impossibility result, [15] defines a weaker notion than the strict stabilization. Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. there may exist processes outside the containment radius that invalidate the specification predicate, due to Byzantine actions. However, the impact of Byzantine triggered action is limited in times: the set of Byzantine processes may only impact processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions.
In the following of this section, we recall the formal definition of strong stabilization adopted in [8] . From the states of c-correct processes, c-legitimate configurations and c-stable configurations are defined as follows.
Definition 4 (c-legitimate configuration)
A configuration ρ is c-legitimate for spec if every c-correct process v satisfies spec(v).
Definition 5 (c-stable configuration) A configuration ρ is c-stable if every c-correct process never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
Roughly speaking, the aim of self-stabilization is to guarantee that a distributed system eventually reaches a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. However, a self-stabilizing system can be disturbed by Byzantine processes after reaching a c-legitimate and c-stable configuration. The c-disruption represents the period where c-correct processes are disturbed by Byzantine processes and is defined as follows
) is a c-disruption if and only if the following holds:
1. e is finite,
e contains at least one action of a c-correct process for changing the value of an O-variable,
3. ρ 0 is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable, and 4. ρ t is the first configuration after ρ 0 such that ρ t is c-legitimate for spec and c-stable. Now we can define a self-stabilizing protocol such that Byzantine processes may only impact processes outside the containment radius a bounded number of times, even if Byzantine processes execute an infinite number of actions. Note that a (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration is a (c, f )-contained configuration when t = k = 0, and thus, (t, k, c, f )-time contained configuration is a generalization (relaxation) of a (c, f )-contained configuration. Thus, a strongly stabilizing protocol is weaker than a strictly stabilizing one (as processes outside the containment radius may take incorrect actions due to Byzantine influence). However, a strongly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical selfstabilizing one (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameters t, k and c are introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each process to know the values of the parameters.
4 Topology-aware Byzantine resilience
Topology-aware strict stabilization
In Section 3.1, we saw that there exist a number of impossibility results on strict stabilization due to the notion of r-restrictives specifications. To circumvent this impossibility result, we describe here a weaker notion than the strict stabilization: the topology-aware strict stabilization (denoted by TA strict stabilization for short) introduced by [9] . Here, the requirement to the containment radius is relaxed, i.e. the set of processes which may be disturbed by Byzantine ones is not reduced to the union of c-neighborhood of Byzantine processes but can be defined depending on the graph topology and Byzantine processes location.
In the following, we give formal definition of this new kind of Byzantine containment. From now, B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and S B (which is function of B) denotes a subset of V (intuitively, this set gathers all processes which may be disturbed by Byzantine processes).
Definition 9 (S B -correct node) A node is S B -correct if it is a correct node ( i.e. not Byzantine) which not belongs to S B .
Definition 10 (S B -legitimate configuration) A configuration ρ is S B -legitimate for spec if every S B -correct node v is legitimate for spec ( i.e. if spec(v) holds).
, every configuration is S B -legitimate and every S B -correct process never changes its O-variables.
The parameter S B of Definition 11 refers to the containment area. Any process which belongs to this set may be infinitely disturbed by Byzantine processes. The parameter f refers explicitly to the number of Byzantine processes.
Definition 12 ((S B , f )-topology-aware strict stabilization) A protocol is (S B , f )-topologyaware strictly stabilizing for specification spec if, given at most f Byzantine processes, any execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . contains a configuration ρ i that is (S B , f )-topology-aware contained for spec.
Note that, if B denotes the set of Byzantine processes and S
then a (S B , f )-topology-aware strictly stabilizing protocol is a (c, f )-strictly stabilizing protocol. Then, the concept of topology-aware strict stabilization is a generalization of the strict stabilization. However, note that a TA strictly stabilizing protocol is stronger than a classical self-stabilizing protocol (that may never meet their specification in the presence of Byzantine processes).
The parameter S B is introduced to quantify the strength of fault containment, we do not require each process to know the actual definition of the set. Actually, the protocol proposed in this paper assumes no knowledge on the parameter.
Topology-aware strong stabilization
Similarly to topology-aware strict stabilization, we can weaken the notion of strong stabilization using the notion of containment area. Then, we obtain the following definition: 
stable if every S B -correct process never changes the values of its O-variables as long as Byzantine processes make no action.
Definition 14 (S B -TA-disruption) A portion of execution e = ρ 0 , ρ 1 , . . . , ρ t (t > 1) is a S B - TA-disruption
BFS Spanning Tree Construction
In this section, we are interested in the problem of BFS spanning tree construction. That is, the system has a distinguished process called the root (and denoted by r) and we want to obtain a BFS spanning tree rooted to this root. We made the following hypothesis: the root r is never Byzantine. To solve this problem, each process v has two O-variables: the first is prnt v ∈ N v ∪ {⊥} which is a pointer to the neighbor that is designated to be the parent of v in the BFS tree and the second is level v ∈ {0, . . . , D} which stores the depth (the number of hops from the root) of v in this tree. Obviously, Byzantine process may disturb (at least) their neighbors. For example, a Byzantine process may act as the root. It is why the specification of the BFS tree construction we adopted states in fact that there exists a BFS spanning forest such that any root of this forest is either the real root of the system or a Byzantine process. More formally, we use the following specification of the problem. We define the specification predicate spec(v) of the BFS spanning tree construction as follows. In the case where any process is correct, note that spec implies the existence of a BFS spanning tree rooted to the real root. The well-known min+1 protocol solves this problem in a self-stabilizing way (see [13] ). In the following of this section, we assume that some processes may be Byzantine and we study the Byzantine containment properties of this protocol. We show that this self-stabilizing protocol has moreover optimal Byzantine containment properties.
In more details, we prove first that there exists neither strictly nor strongly stabilizing solution to the BFS spanning tree construction (see Theorems 1 and 2) . Then, we demonstrate in Theorems 3 and 4 that the min + 1 protocol is both (S B , f )-TA strictly and (t, S * B , f )-TA strongly stabilizing where f ≤ n − 1, t = 2m, and 
Impossibility results

Theorem 1 Even under the central daemon, there exists no (c, 1)-strictly stabilizing protocol for BFS spanning tree construction where c is any (finite) integer.
Proof This result is a direct application of Theorem 4 of [17] (note that the specification of BFS tree construction is D-restrictive in the worst case where D is the diameter of the system).
Theorem 2 Even under the central daemon, there exists no (t, c, 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol for BFS spanning tree construction where t and c are any (finite) integers.
Proof Let t and c be (finite) integers. Assume that there exists a (t, c, 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol P for BFS spanning tree construction under the central daemon. Let S = (V, E) be the following system V = {p 0 = r, p 1 , . . . , p 2c+2 , p 2c+3 = b} and E = {{p i , p i+1 }, i ∈ {0, . . . , 2c + 2}}. Process p 0 is the real root and process b is a Byzantine one. Assume that the initial configuration ρ 0 of S satisfies: level r = level b = 0, prnt r = prnt b = ⊥ and other variables of b (if any) are identical to those of r (see Figure 2) . Assume now that b takes exactly the same actions as r (if any) immediately after r (note that d(r, b) > c and hence level r = 0 and prnt r = ⊥ still hold by closure and then level b = 0 and prnt b = ⊥ still hold too). Then, by symmetry of the execution and by convergence of P to spec, we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ 1 (see Figure 2 ) in which: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , c + 1}, level p i = i and prnt p i = p i−1 and ∀i ∈ {c + 2, . . . , 2c + 2}, level p i = 2c + 3 − i and prnt p i = p i+1 (because this configuration is the only one in which all correct process v such that d(v, b) > c satisfies spec(v) when level r = level b = 0 and prnt r = prnt b = ⊥). Note that ρ 1 is 0-legitimate and 0-stable and a fortiori c-legitimate and c-stable. Assume now that the Byzantine process acts as a correct process and executes correctly P. Then, by convergence of P in fault-free systems (remember that a (t, c, 1)-strongly stabilizing protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing protocol), we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ 2 (see Figure 2 ) in which: ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , 2c + 3}, level p i = i and prnt p i = p i−1 (because this configuration is the only one in which every process v satisfies spec(v)). Note that the portion of execution between ρ 1 and ρ 2 contains at least one c-perturbation (p c+2 is a c-correct process and modifies at least once its O-variables) and that ρ 2 is 0-legitimate and 0-stable and a fortiori c-legitimate and c-stable.
Assume now that the Byzantine process b takes the following state: level b = 0 and prnt b = ⊥. This step brings the system into configuration ρ 3 (see Figure 2) . From this configuration, we can repeat the execution we constructed from ρ 0 . By the same token, we obtain an execution of P which contains c-legitimate and c-stable configurations (see ρ 1 ) and an infinite number of c-perturbation which contradicts the (t, c, 1)-strong stabilization of P.
Byzantine containment properties of the min + 1 protocol
In the min + 1 protocol, as in many self-stabilizing tree construction protocols, each process v checks locally the consistence of its level v variable with respect to the one of its neighbors. When it detects an inconsistency, it changes its prnt v variable in order to choose a "better" neighbor. The notion of "better" neighbor is based on the global desired property on the tree (here, the BFS requirement implies to choose one neighbor with the minimum level).
When the system may contain Byzantine processes, they may disturb their neighbors by pro-viding alternatively "better" and "worse" states. The min+1 protocol chooses an arbitrary one of the "better" neighbors (that is, neighbors with the minimal level). Actually this strategy allows us to achieve the (S B , f )-TA strict stabilization but is not sufficient to achieve the (t, S * B , f )-TA strong stabilization. To achieve the (t, S * B , f )-TA strong stabilization, we must bring a slight modification to the protocol: we choose a "better" neighbor with a round robin order (among its neighbors with the minimal level).
Algorithm 5.1 presents our BFS spanning tree construction protocol SSBFS which is both (S B , f )-TA strictly and (t, S * B , f )-TA strongly stabilizing (where f ≤ n − 1 and t = 2m) provided that the root is never Byzantine. Rules:
In the following of this section, we provide proofs of topology-aware strict and strong stabilization of SSBFS. First at all, remember that the real root r can not be a Byzantine process by hypothesis. Note that the subsystems whose set of nodes are respectively V \ S B and V \ S * B are connected by construction.
(S B , n − 1)-TA strict stabilization Given a configuration ρ ∈ C and an integer d ∈ {0, . . . , D}, let us define the following predicate: Proof Let d be an integer such that d ∈ {0, . . . , D}. Let ρ ∈ C be a configuration such that I d (ρ) = true and ρ ′ ∈ C be a configuration such that ρ R → ρ ′ is a step of SSBFS.
If the root process r ∈ R (respectively a Byzantine process b ∈ R), then we have level r = 0 (respectively level b ≥ 0) in ρ ′ by construction of (R r ) (respectively by definition of level b ). Hence, 
We can deduce that I d (ρ ′ ) = true, that concludes the proof. Let LC be the following set of configurations:
Proof Let ρ be a configuration of LC. By construction, ρ is S B -legitimate for spec.
In particular, the root process satisfies: prnt r = ⊥ and level r = 0. By construction of SSBFS, r is not enabled and then never modifies its O-variables (since the guard of the rule of r does not involve the state of its neighbors).
In the same way, any process v ∈ V \ (S B ∪ {r}) satisfies: prnt v ∈ N v , level v = level prntv + 1, and level prntv = min u∈Nv {level u }. Note that, as v ∈ V \ (S B ∪ {r}) and spec(v) holds in ρ, we have:
Hence, process v is not enabled in ρ. It remains so until none of its neighbors u modifies its level u variable to a value α such that α ≤ level v − 2.
Assume that there exists an execution e starting from ρ in which a neighbor u of a process v ∈ V \(S B ∪{r}) modifies level u to satisfy level u ≤ level v −2 (without loss of generality, assume that u is the first process to modify level u in such a way in e). Note that min 
This contradicts the closure of predicate I D established in Lemma 1.
Consequently, there exists no such execution and process v remains infinitely disabled and then never modifies its O-variables. This concludes the proof.
Lemma 3 Starting from any configuration, any execution of SSBFS reaches a configuration of LC in a finite time.
Proof We are going to prove the following property by induction on d ∈ {0, . . . , D}:
(P d ): Starting from any configuration, any run of SSBFS reaches a configuration ρ such that I d (ρ) = true and in which any process v / ∈ S B such that d(v, r) ≤ d satisfies spec(v).
Let ρ be an arbitrary configuration. Then, it is obvious that I 0 (ρ) is satisfied.
If a process v / ∈ S B satisfies d(v, r) ≤ 0, then v = r. If v does not satisfy spec(v) in ρ, then v is continuously enabled. Since the scheduling is fair, v is activated in a finite time and then v satisfies spec(v) in a finite time. Then, we proved that (P 0 ) holds.
We know, by P d−1 , that any run of SSBFS under a distributed fair scheduler reaches a configuration ρ such that I d−1 (ρ) = true and in which any process v /
Note that any process v ∈ E d such that level v = d − 1 is enabled by (R v ) since we have: level prntv ≥ d − 1 (by I d−1 (ρ) and the fact that prnt v is a neighbor of v) and thus level v = d − 1 < level prntv + 1. Moreover, this rule remains enabled until v is activated by closure of I d−1 (ρ) (see Lemma 1) . As the scheduling is fair, we deduce that any process v ∈ E d such that level v = d − 1 is activated in any run starting from ρ and level v ≥ d holds. Then, we can conclude that any run starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ ′ such that
Let v / ∈ S B be a process such that d(r, v) = d. We distinguish the following two cases: 
In conclusion, v always satisfies spec(v) in any run starting from ρ ′ .
Case 2: spec(v) does not hold in ρ ′ . By construction of ρ ′ , we can split N v into two sets S andS such that any process u of S satisfies level u = d(r, u) = d − 1 and spec(u) (and thus there exists a BFS path from u to r) and any process u ofS satisfies level u ≥ d (remind that I d (ρ ′ ) = true and then
As spec(v) does not hold in ρ ′ , we can deduce that v is enabled in ρ ′ . As I d is closed (by Lemma 1), we can deduce that v remains enabled. Since the scheduling is fair, we conclude that v is activated in a finite time in any run starting from ρ ′ and then prnt v is a process of S that implies that v satisfies spec(v) in a finite time in any run starting from ρ ′ .
In conclusion, P d is true, that ends the induction.
Then, it is easy to see that P D (where D is the diameter of the system) implies the result.
Theorem 3 SSBFS is a (S B , n − 1)-TA strictly stabilizing protocol for spec.
Proof This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 2 and 3. Proof Let ρ be a configuration of LC and v be a process such that v ∈ E B . By contradiction, assume that there exists an execution starting from ρ such that (i) spec(v) is infinitely often false in e and (ii) v is never activated in e.
For any configuration ρ, let us denote by
the maximal sequence of processes following pointers prnt (maximal means here that either prnt pv = ⊥ or p v is the first process such that there p v = v i for some i ∈ {0, . . . , k}).
Let us study the following cases:
Since ρ ∈ LC, prnt v satisfies spec(prnt v ) in ρ and in any execution starting from ρ (by Lemma 2). If v does not satisfy spec(v) in ρ, then we have level v = level prntv + 1 in ρ. Then, v is continuously enabled in e and we have a contradiction between assumption (ii) and the fairness of the scheduling. This implies that v satisfies spec(v) in ρ. The closure of I D (established in Lemma 1) ensures us that v is never enabled in any execution starting from ρ. Hence, spec(v) remains true in any execution starting from ρ. This contradicts the assumption (i) on e.
Case 2: prnt v / ∈ V \ S B in ρ. By the assumption (i) on e, we can deduce that there exists infinitely many configurations ρ ′ such that a process of P v (ρ ′ ) is enabled. By construction, the length of P v (ρ ′ ) is finite for any configuration ρ ′ and there exists only a finite number of processes in the system. Consequently, there exists at least one process which is infinitely often enabled in e. Since the scheduler is fair, we can conclude that there exists at least one process which is infinitely often activated in e.
Let A e be the set of processes which are infinitely often activated in e. Note that v / ∈ A e by assumption (ii) on e. Let e ′ = ρ ′ . . . be the suffix of e which contains only activations of processes of A e . Let p be the first process of P v (ρ ′ ) which belongs to A e (p exists since at least one process of P v is enabled when spec(v) is false). By construction, the prefix of P v (ρ ′′ ) from v to p in any configuration ρ ′′ of e remains the same as the one of P v (ρ ′ ). Let p ′ be the process such that prnt p ′ = p in e ′ (p ′ exists since v = p implies that the prefix of P v (ρ ′ ) from v to p counts at least two processes). As p is infinitely often activated and as any activation of p modifies the value of level p (it takes at least two different values in e ′ ), we can deduce that p ′ is infinitely often enabled in e ′ (since the value of level p ′ is constant by construction of e ′ and p). Since the scheduler is fair, p ′ is activated in a finite time in e ′ , that contradicts the construction of p.
In the two cases, we obtain a contradiction with the construction of e, that proves the result.
Let LC * be the following set of configurations:
Note that, as S * B ⊆ S B , we can deduce that LC * ⊆ LC. Hence, properties of Lemmas 4 and 5 also apply to configurations of LC * .
Lemma 6 Any configuration of LC * is (2m, ∆, S * B , n − 1)-TA time contained for spec.
Proof Let ρ be a configuration of LC * . As S * B ⊆ S B , we know by Lemma 2 that any process v of V \ S B satisfies spec(v) and takes no action in any execution starting from ρ.
Let v be a process of E B . By Lemmas 4 and 5, we know that v takes at most ∆ v actions in any execution starting from ρ. Moreover, we know that v satisfies spec(v) after its last action (otherwise, we obtain a contradiction between the two lemmas). Hence, any process of E B takes at most ∆ v ≤ ∆ actions and then, there are at most v∈V ∆ v = 2m S * B -TA-disruptions in any execution starting from ρ.
By definition of a TA time contained configuration, we obtain the result. LC * in a finite time under a distributed fair scheduler.
Proof Let ρ be an arbitrary configuration. We know by Lemma 3 that any execution starting from ρ reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ ′ of LC. Let v be a process of E B . By Lemmas 4 and 5, we know that v takes at most ∆ v actions in any execution starting from ρ ′ . Moreover, we know that v satisfies spec(v) after its last action (otherwise, we obtain a contradiction between the two lemmas). This implies that any execution starting from ρ ′ reaches a configuration ρ ′′ such that any process v of E B satisfies spec(v). It is easy to see that ρ ′′ ∈ LC * , that ends the proof.
Theorem 4 SSBFS is a (2m, S * B , n − 1)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol for spec.
Proof This result is a direct consequence of Lemmas 6 and 7.
5.3 Optimality of containment areas of the min + 1 protocol Proof Let P be a (t, A B , 1)-TA strongly stabilizing protocol for BFS spanning tree construction protocol where A B S * B and t is a finite integer. We must distinguish the following cases: Consider the following system: V = {r, u, u ′ , v, v ′ , b} and E = {{r, u}, {r, u ′ }, {u, v}, {u ′ , v ′ }, {v, b}, {v ′ , b}} (b is a Byzantine process). We can see that S * B = {v, v ′ }. Assume now that b takes exactly the same actions as r (if any) immediately after r. Then, by symmetry of the execution and by convergence of P to spec, we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ 1 (see Figure 3) in which: prnt r = prnt b = ⊥, prnt u = prnt u ′ = r, prnt v = prnt v ′ = b, level r = level b = 0 and level u = level u ′ = level v = level v ′ = 1 (because this configuration is the only one in which all correct process v satisfies spec(v) when prnt r = prnt b = ⊥ and level r = level b = 0). Note that ρ 1 is A B -legitimate for spec and A B -stable (whatever A B is).
Assume now that b behaves as a correct process with respect to P. Then, by convergence of P in a fault-free system starting from ρ 1 which is not legitimate (remember that a strongly-stabilizing protocol is a special case of self-stabilizing protocol), we can deduce that the system reaches in a finite time a configuration ρ 2 (see Figure 3) in which: prnt r = ⊥, prnt u = prnt u ′ = r, prnt v = u, prnt v ′ = u ′ , prnt b = v (or prnt b = v ′ ), level r = 0, level u = level u ′ = 1 level v = level v ′ = 2 and level b = 3. Note that processes v and v ′ modify their O-variables in the portion of execution between ρ 1 and ρ 2 and that ρ 2 is A B -legitimate for spec and A B -stable (whatever A B is). Consequently, this portion of execution contains at least one A B -TA-disruption (whatever A B is). Assume now that the Byzantine process b takes the following state: prnt b = ⊥ and level b = 0. This step brings the system into configuration ρ 3 (see Figure 3) . From this configuration, we can repeat the execution we constructed from ρ 0 . By the same token, we obtain an execution of P which contains c-legitimate and c-stable configurations (see ρ 1 ) and an infinite number of A B -TA-disruption (whatever A B is) which contradicts the (t, A B , 1)-TA strong stabilization of P.
Conclusion
In this article, we are interested in the BFS spanning tree construction in presence of both systemic transient faults and permanent Byzantine failures. As this task is global, it is impossible to solve it in a strictly stabilizing way. We proved then that there exists no solution to this problem even if we consider the weaker notion of strong stabilization.
Then, we provide a study of Byzantine containment properties of the well-known min + 1 protocol. This protocol is one of the simplest self-stabilizing protocols which solve this problem. However, we prove that it achieves optimal area containment with respect to the notion of topologyaware strict and strong stabilization. All our results are summarized in the above table.
BFS spanning tree construction (c, f )-strict stabilization Impossible (for any c and f ) (Theorem 1) (t, c, f )-strong stabilization Impossible (for any t, c, f ) (Theorem 2) (AB, f )-TA strict stabilization Impossible (for any f and AB SB) (Theorem 5) (SB, f )-TA strict stabilization Possible (for 0 ≤ f ≤ n − 1) (Theorem 3) (t, AB, f )-TA strong stabilization Impossible (for any f , t and AB S * B ) (Theorem 6) (t, S * B , f )-TA strong stabilization Possible (for 0 ≤ f ≤ n − 1) (Theorem 4, t = 2m)
Using the result of [10] about r-operators, we can easily extend results of this paper to some others problems as depth-search or reliability spanning trees. This work raises the following open questions. Has any other global static task as leader election or maximal matching a topology-aware strictly or/and strongly stabilizing solution ? We can also wonder about non static tasks as mutual exclusion (recall that local mutual exclusion has a strictly stabilizing solution provided by [17] ).
